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Abstract 
The paper addresses the nature of gang governance. It questions the notion that gangs regulate 
social and economic transactions and create stable orders in certain territories. It shows that, 
while presenting themselves as upholders of the ‘law’ in their territory, the gangs also create a 
climate of uncertainty and fear. The gangs manipulate their own unwritten rules and set up 
traps for residents and businessmen. These traps are designed to deprive nongang civilians of 
presumed rights and identities and extort their money. The paper uses Schmitt’s notion of ‘state 
of exception’ and Agamben’s idea of ‘bare life’ to explain how gangs function. 
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Introduction 
There is a growing agreement in gang and organised crime literature that gangs and organised 
crime groups across the world are not just destructive forces of crime and disorder, but that 
they can also participate in governance. Where state governance is weak or absent, criminal 
governance in certain circumstances can allow economic activities to proceed and daily lives 
of citizens to acquire a degree of predictability. An implicit social contract may be in place, in 
which criminal agents of governance deliver a range of services such as dispute resolution, debt 
collection, protection against crimes when committed by outsiders, as well as some welfare 
services to the residents, all in return for obedience and tributary payments. As many authors 
studying racketeering gangs and mafias have argued, these non-state actors often start as 
ruthless predators but ultimately become invested in providing peaceful order and predictable 
taxation.1 Informal regulation helps to sustain social order in a territory, or in a sector of the 
illicit or criminal economy, and it can acquire a degree of legitimacy.2 Micro-governance by 
neighbourhood gangs has also been shown to play an important role in the daily lives of 
citizens, shaping the space of the territories they control and creating alternative social orders.3 
Some gangs and organised crime groups may aspire to establish a regime of supreme 
control in their areas, becoming sovereign agents. The notion of sovereignty has long been 
associated with ultimate authority within a territory, i.e. authority which is absolute rather than 
partial.4 Over time, the nation state became the only structure of sovereignty within its 
territorial borders,5 and Max Weber famously saw the monopoly over the legitimate use of 
physical force as the basis for the state authority.6 However, spaces where state penetration is 
difficult or where it can be successfully subverted, can, it has been argued, develop their own 
regimes of sovereignty. As Robert Latham argued, ‘in late modernity both the state and a 
diverse range of non-state actors . . . can be central to the government in an increasingly wide 
range of social domains’, creating regimes of ‘social sovereignty’.7 This sovereignty, according 
to Latham, is manifested in the ability to set laws, classifications and identities, specific to a 
particular area of social life. There has also been discussion of ‘localised forms of 
sovereignty’,8 or autonomous ruling regimes that share their sovereignty with the state.9 
At the same time the world of illegal governance is also a world of explosive violence, 
uncertainty and fear. Unpredictable and sometimes extreme violence is used by organised 
crime groups and gangs against businessmen and residents, and the very horrors that their rule 
is supposed to eliminate, are inflicted on the subjects of their power. Research based on the 
study of court documents and interviews with gang members, businessmen and residents in 
Italy, Columbia and Russia has demonstrated a high degree of volatility of criminal rulers, with 
members of illegal organisations reneging on their promises, taking away the businesses of 
their clients or killing them, behaving towards both businessmen and residents in unreliable 
and treacherous ways,10 and even promoting acceptance of violence as a tool of conflict 
resolution.11 Wherever we talk about criminal governance we have to concede that while it can 
establish a semblance of social order, at the same time it creates a climate of fear and makes 
life in the community even more violent. The paradox of criminal governance seems to be that 
the rulers can see themselves as governing agents, who set the law in their territory, while 
simultaneously believing in their own impunity and behaving with unpredictability and 
ruthlessness wherever it suits their interests. At the same time businessmen or local residents 
may also believe that gangs or mafias have ‘the law’ but live in fear of explosive and extreme 
violence delivered by the ‘legislators’.  
This paradox of lawlessness as a constitutive part of criminal governance is explained 
by some authors as arising from the imperative for members of organised crime groups or 
gangs to build a reputation for violence that would allow them to minimise the actual use of 
violence .12 In the absence of the stable institutions of legal and rational order that are only 
possible in modern states, periodic displays of violence help to sustain the power regime in 
which criminal organisations can be seen as a credible force. Other authors, however, refer to 
the intrinsic duality of criminal governance. As Federico Varese has demonstrated, in his 
review of studies of mafia protection, while the mafia does sometimes provide real protection, 
this can also turn into violent extortion; he notes that ‘Mafias (and states) do both’.13 Analysing 
the existing accounts of protection rackets in Russia, Caroline Humphrey also argues that 
racketeering involves a combination of predation and provision of a service. While effectively 
selling their law, ‘the powerful are expected to dictate their terms and be jealous and punitive 
too’.14 Humphrey is sceptical about seeing gangs as rational agents capable of stable 
governance. She argues that overpredation on the sources of income, unnecessary and extreme 
violence to which the users of protection are often submitted are evidence of the gangs’ 
irrationality and a lack of imagination to perform genuine regulatory and quasi-state 
functions.15 I would argue, however, that wilful volatility, rather than being a sign of the gangs’ 
deficiencies as enforcers and rulers, is the ultimate expression of criminal power – just as it is 
of state power. 
The unpredictability and capacity to suspend legal and normative order on which 
individuals or businesses have come to rely is not limited to gangs and is profoundly implicated 
in the whole nature of power. As Karl Schmitt16 and, following him, Giorgio Agamben17 
proposed, the state of exception is the paradigm of power. Here the law is suspended and the 
subjects are plunged into a situation that they experience as lawless and anomic. In place of 
normal law that gives certain protections to the citizens, a new order may emerge that negates 
the law, and where individuals suddenly face the prospect of annihilation or being placed at the 
margins or outside the borders of the community. They become what Agamben called ‘bare 
life’,18 defined through subjection to sovereign power and ‘capacity to be killed’.19 State 
sovereignty rests on the state of exception, and law itself may be vague and unclear and applied 
inconsistently, signifying nothing other than the pure power of the sovereign to make decisions 
about the lives of his subjects. Arguing with contractual understanding of the nature of 
sovereignty, Agamben instead interprets Hobbesian ideas about sovereign power as meaning 
that ‘the foundation of sovereign power is to be sought not in the subject’s free renunciation of 
his natural rights but in the sovereign’s preservation of his natural rights to do anything to 
anyone, which now appears as the right to punish’.20 
This understanding of law and lawlessness as two dialectically connected parts of 
sovereignty, when applied to criminal sovereignty, makes it possible to see the situational, 
vague and unpredictable exercise of power by illegal agents of territorial governance as an 
intrinsic part of their rule. The illegal rulers, and members of the public, may subscribe to the 
ideology according to which organised gangs or mafias act to prevent lawlessness (in Russia 
this ideology is expressed in the widely held belief that they stand against bespredel, criminal 
slang for lawlessness). However, the right to impose their will regardless of the law that they 
claim to uphold is constitutive of criminal power – in the same way as it is a constitutive part 
of sovereignty of the modern state. Instead of undermining the rule, it sustains it. 
In this paper I describe the world of gang governance as a world of sovereignty, which, 
following Agamben,21 I see as power over life, as a form of authority in which law and 
lawlessness are co-present. The space in which gangs operate is a space where application of 
alternative gang law and conduct codes are vague, and a person can be placed in a terrifying 
space of simultaneous presence and absence of law. In this space of exception, the rules of 
‘orderly’ behavior are often suspended or inverted and replaced with norms that are unknown 
and have to be guessed at, or where they suddenly do not apply, with the ultimate possibility 
of violence or even death. Vagueness and the terrifying prospect presented to the residents and 
businessmen of turning into bare life, are political strategies and the expression of sovereign 
rule. I suggest that political strategies of the gangs can be analysed as strategies of entrapment, 
constructions of traps, which I see as spaces/positions into which the power holders, using 
deceit and obfuscation, manoeuvre individuals in order to strip them of their rights, identities 
and capacity for purposeful action. A trap is a space of exception, where the subjects of power 
find themselves at the mercy of the powerful. In this paper I analyse the traps that are set by 
the gangs through verbal communication with members of the population (I call them 
‘civilians’), and the traps inherent in the relationship of criminal protection. 
The processes of entrapment can be studied both from the perspective of the victims, 
and from the perspective of the gang members. In this paper I look at both. I analyse advice 
published on Russian Internet sites on how to behave in the event of encountering a violent 
street gang. These Internet resources, such as the sites dedicated to martial arts and fighting 
skills (iskusstvoboya.ru), weapons (guns.ru), prisons and prison culture (tyurem.net), or 
similarly themed specialised forums on pikabu.ru (the Russian analogue of reddit), contain 
posts and conversation threads by members of the public. The contributors are adults and young 
people, predominantly male, from across Russia who offer advice based on their own 
experiences of past encounters with violent street gang members (gopniki). I would argue that, 
in aggregate, they are representative of how social actors attempt to make sense of the street 
social order. This can be seen as an example of what Garfinkel termed ‘reflexivity’, where 
actors, through verbal display, attempt to identify patterns and structures in everyday reality, 
and use them for practical purposes.22 
I also use the interviews with members of entrepreneurial gangs and local residents 
which I and members of my research team conducted in the Russian city of Kazan in 2005–
2011. Kazan has been known as one of the major locations of gang activity in Russia since the 
1970s, and although their presence and power have reduced in the 2000s, the gangs have 
remained entrenched in peripheral areas of the city, with their members conducting protection 
operations and victimising non-gang youth.23 The project involved semi-structured interviews 
with active members of organised entrepreneurial gangs, aged from 17–35 from different areas 
of Kazan, as well as in-depth interviews with local residents, victims of gang violence and 
businessmen. Gang research presents many potential problems in terms of access and 
developing trust.24 In this study the initial contacts were made by members of the Kazan 
research team (who lived in areas with high gang presence) via friends and neighbours of gang 
members. Access to other participants was obtained via students from the university where two 
members of the research team, Alexander Salagaev and Rustem Safin, worked, and through 
further snowballing. While some of the interviewees were personally known to the research 
team, they were all guaranteed anonymity and were assured that neither they nor their gangs 
would be identified in the transcripts and research outputs. The data (together with secondary 
sources on Russian gangs) are used to validate the accounts of street victimisation on Internet 
forums and provide further evidence on the nature of social relations inherent in criminal 
protection. 
We need to treat the qualitative data reported in internet forum accounts and interviews 
with some caution. The data containing reconstructions of encounters between civilians and 
gang members may, in some cases, include exaggeration or concealment; street encounters are 
messy and unpredictable; and there may be a tendency to filter out more mundane interaction 
in favour of more extreme events. Some civilians, those more savvy in the rules of the street or 
those with connections to powerful figures in the area, may be able to avoid the traps set by 
gangs and are perhaps less likely to contribute to these forums.25 However, as my main purpose 
in using this evidence is to identify the unwritten rules that govern communication between the 
gangs and civilians and to describe the overlapping understanding of the extant normative order 
– to which people orient themselves, and which they presume to be factual – it is the perceptions 
of this order expressed by participants that are of most relevance to my argument. 
There is also a question of how far this analysis is generalisable to other national 
contexts, as the social, cultural and economic realities and legislative frameworks can vary 
widely.26 This question applies to most gang and organised crime research, which is often 
conducted in the form of localised studies, but is nevertheless used to inform wider debates 
about criminal governance.27 Identifying the unwritten rules of the social order that emerge 
from the accounts of societal members helps us to understand the complexities of criminal 
power, and the malignant operation of its law, that are often dismissed in academic accounts 
that focus predominantly on the useful function and utility of criminal protection. 
 
The Russian gang world 
There are many definitional issues concerning the gang28 as the term is commonly applied to a 
wide diversity of groups, from street organisations that engage in episodic and non-
instrumental violence to entrepreneurial gangs that share many definitional features with 
organised crime.29 Russian gangs are also typologically diverse. These can be neighbourhood 
peer groups that come together to socialise on the streets without any substantial involvement 
in crime and violence. There are also violent male peer groups involved in territorial control in 
their neighbourhood, and entrepreneurial gangs, offering criminal protection. Both of the latter 
establish localised sovereignty in the space of the neighbourhood or wider urban territory, in 
which the gangs have rights over ‘their’ land, and in which they execute command based on 
their own law (poniatiia, literally ‘understandings’), enforced through direct violence or its 
potentiality. 
Violent male peer groups unite local young men aged from 12–14 to 18–20 years in 
many neighbourhoods across Russia, particularly in low income areas, where there can also be 
substantial populations of ex-convicts. Studies of these groups in the peripheral areas of 
Moscow and Kazan30 and other cities across the Russian Federation31 show that these young 
people see themselves as the key agents of the street social order. They police the borders of 
their community, attack their peers and groups defined as the enemies (members of outside 
youth groups, ethnic minorities or homosexuals), participate in arranged fights with the 
members of ‘enemy’ gangs. They are also involved in street intimidation, extortion and assault, 
predominantly directed at young men who do not belong to their groups. At the same time 
members of these gangs see themselves as belonging to rule-governed societies, and they have 
a code of behaviour that is perceived as an alternative code of law. This code is heavily 
influenced by the Soviet criminal culture and the code of the thieves-in-law (vory-v-zakone), 
a criminal community that originated in the Soviet Gulag whose code became widely 
disseminated thanks to ex-convicts settling back in the community, urban folklore and 
increasingly the mass media.32 The code was also adopted and modified by the new generation 
of post-Soviet organised criminals, the so-called bandits.33 
Poniatiia prescribe particular gender performances in line with traditional constructions 
of hegemonic masculinity.34 Young men who embrace the code construct a persona of a ‘lad’, 
a young man who can demonstrate toughness, fearlessness, resolve, an ability to react quickly 
to provocation and other manifestations of ‘manliness’. The code of poniatiia has prescriptions 
relating to the principles of fraternity, equality and fairness within the gang, as well as 
prohibitions on attacks against women, children and old people. Any violence towards them, 
as well as unmotivated and extreme violence towards any non-gang civilians, is seen as 
bespredel. Nevertheless, as I will explain later, these prohibitions are violated by the gang on 
a daily basis. 
Poniatiia are built around a radical distinction between the lads (patsany), the members 
of the gangs who possess the supreme power on the streets and are owed respect and obedience, 
and the civilians (lokhi), the despised and passive subjects of their rule. Behaviours that are 
interpreted as disrespect and disobedience towards the lads need to be punished.  
In some areas of Russia we also find entrepreneurial neighbourhood gangs. The 
members of these gangs also call themselves the lads (albeit with the added adjectives of ‘real’ 
or ‘concrete’ lads). Some of them are associated with serious organised crime networks of adult 
criminals, with thieves-in-law, and with more entrepreneurial bandits.35 Others are 
independent. 
The gangs typically have cohort structures based on age, with active membership aged 
from 18–30. Younger people provide protection to their peers, demanding tribute on a regular 
basis, protect illicit gaming establishments, control street prostitution networks and run street 
drugs operations. They also re-sell stolen mobile phones, set up illicit parking lots, and some 
of the members are involved in street assault and burglary. The leaders of the gangs, avtoritety, 
together with their close associates, organise large-scale protection operations and participate 
in other serious organised crime activities, such as setting up various illegal schemes of tax 
evasion and money laundering, and run large-scale illegal drugs business. Some combine these 
activities with legal business. These entrepreneurial gangs subscribe to a similar code of 
conduct to that of the street, but their system of classifications also includes a category of 
komersy (businessmen), seen, together with lokhi, as being on the opposite side of the hierarchy 
of human worth to the lads, and owing them tribute for the right to work in ‘their’ territory.36 
Since the 2000s, the influence and territorial presence of gangs across Russia have 
receded as a result of economic and social stabilisation and strengthening of the state.37 But 
although the power of gangs is nothing like it was in the 1990s, there is evidence of a current 
revival, particularly in poor, economically depressed areas of Russia. Lacking opportunities in 
the legal economy, young people form their own criminal groups and join the structures of 
entrepreneurial bandit gangs.38 No longer able to act with impunity, their leaders enter shifting 
competitive and collaborative relations with agents of the state. While those unwilling to 
subject to the power of the state are prosecuted and incarcerated, others become involved in 
informal trade-offs, co-operating in elections, devising collaborative illegal schemes and using 
each other’s violent resource.39 The state can allow the gangs to develop regimes of localised 
sovereignty – as long as their leaders stay within set parameters.40 Just like other non-state 
agents of violence, such as vigilante groups, the gangs can impose their law, and punish 
transgressors, while being tolerated or even enabled by the state.41  
In what follows, I describe the political strategies of street and entrepreneurial gangs 
that aim to establish them as agents of localised sovereignty in the territory. 
 
Political strategies of violent street gangs: the trap of conversation 
The gangs do not follow the accepted social conventions. They speak their own language and 
have their own rules, and they may attack a passer-by without warning, or subject him to 
interrogation according to their own judicial procedure that is unclear and incomprehensible. 
Within the online discussion and advice on ‘dealing with’ gopniki, we see how members of the 
public attempt to outline the rules of interaction in this world where the norms of ‘civilised’ 
behavior are suddenly and terrifyingly suspended, and defenceless, vulnerable human beings 
encounter what may seem as a hostile occupying force. Here, new rules that always have to be 
guessed at and imputed, manifest themselves. Failure to supply correct answers during the 
gopniki’s interrogation may result in violent ‘punishment’, robbery and physical assault. While 
victims of the gangs do have the option of appealing to the police, many do not, whether 
because of a social stigma for a young man of appearing ‘weak’, or because of widespread 
belief that such appeals will only be met with inaction by disinterested or corrupt officers.42  
Descriptions of various encounters show that the representatives of the aforementioned 
force – the lads or gopniki – improvise, and express themselves through evasions and hints, but 
their behaviour has its own underlying logic. What emerges is not simple situational 
manipulation that puts the victims on the defensive at a particular moment in time, what Collins 
calls a ‘claim to dominate the interactional space’,43 but thoroughly political behaviour. It is 
aimed, I would argue, at establishing themselves as agents of sovereignty in their local turf who 
have power over life and have the right to dictate the rules. They are the source of law with the 
power to decide who is guilty and who is not according to their own code, while a lack of 
understanding of their laws (in similarity with other legal systems) does not eliminate guilt. In 
fact, not knowing the rules already constitutes guilt. 
According to the authors of the advice, there are two types of encounter with members 
of the street gangs. One is known as ‘assault through bespredel’, in other words, assault through 
lawless violence. This is where the gopniki blatantly tell you to give them your money or lash 
out at you without any preceding conversation. The power here is exercised as pure force, while 
the use of the slang word ‘bespredel’ signifies that the agents of street ‘authority’ are 
suspending their own laws. The only option for a more or less dignified exit for a civilian is to 
hit one of them first and then run away as fast as one can (but this can result in a delayed and 
potentially more catastrophic consequences if and when a person returns to the area). 
Alternatively, one should forget about one’s dignity and just run immediately. 
The other type of encounter is characterised as ‘assault through conversation’. This is 
where a vague chance exists to avoid violence and maintain dignity by conducting oneself in a 
way that the potential assailants would see as legitimate according to their own code. This may 
work for those young people who have grown up on the street and who possess the necessary 
subcultural knowledge of how to behave competently within this space.44 For the rest, the 
chances of ‘getting off through conversation’ are, by common agreement, small, but they 
nevertheless exist, and this is what most advice tries to help with. 
Descriptions of ‘assault through conversation’, show what Jack Katz calls ‘a typical 
opening stratagem in street robberies – the use of civility to move into position of moral 
dominance’.45 Many posts describe the opening gambit by the assailants as overly polite. A 
member of a street group may greet the potential victim by offering a handshake. This is, 
however, an invitation into a trap. A handshake is likely to be followed up by an enquiry, not 
untypical in street worlds elsewhere, about where the victim is from, followed by a seemingly 
profound philosophical question: ‘Who are you in this life?’ This leads further into a trap. 
Instead of meditating on this question and coming up with insights about his place in society 
or the universe, the person needs to respond with a highly specific answer. He must describe 
his social status in terms that correspond to the system of classifications upheld by the 
interrogators and be ready to justify his answer, again using their own terms. This judicial 
process presumes the understanding of the laws that can only be acquired through previous 
experience on the streets, and even that understanding can be challenged. Failing to reply 
correctly, and then explain his response, he becomes immediately guilty. The main purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish whether one is a lad, a ‘proper’ man and a citizen of the street 
world, or a helpless civilian, a person with no rights and consequently fair game for physical 
assault or extortion. Ultimately, the conversation is designed to place one irrefutably in the 
position of a lokh, a position that corresponds to Agamben’s bare life. As a result of this 
conversation, the interrogators may or may not decide to apply violence, but irrespective of 
that, the potentiality of violence always remains. In fact, this potentiality, rather than violence 
itself, represents their power and this is why ‘assault through conversation’ takes place at all. 
Although the online experts present themselves as competent interpreters of street 
legislation and process, they warn their readers that it is not possible to give advice to people 
who do not already implicitly understand the rules:  
 
It is impossible to describe every situation. Unless you have a sense of what to do . . . 
And if you can’t do it, and you don’t know ‘who you are in this world’, then it’s best 
simply to run away, as you will not be able to ‘get off’ through proper conversation, 
and even if you hit one of them, next time they will go after you with twice as big a 
crowd (‘uralbrat’46).  
 
Advice conveys the sense that the law is in force but it is inscrutable and any attempts by the 
victim to understand the clearly present regime of power, to try to guess its logic and rules, 
may be undermined and subverted. Like K., the hero of Kafka’s The Trial (1998), a person 
finds himself a victim of an inherently incomprehensible judicial order that pronounces him 
perpetrator of a crime whose nature is unclear to him and under the laws that he does not know. 
Again, a lack of knowledge of the law does not alleviate the guilt and can be construed as a 
transgression in its own right. 
That is why ‘lay experts’ on street law constantly repeat the advice that a person is 
better off not getting into a conversation and walking or running away from the trap (although 
this may itself be construed as a lack of respect and entail punishment). 
 
If the gopniki shout at you: ‘Hey you, come here’, then you are already on the path 
towards a conflict. Now you should not get panicky or talk back, but you should not go 
towards them. Naturally, if you have already made the gopnik interested, he will come 
to you himself, and will, as per tradition, stretch out his hand, and this is the most 
important moment. By shaking his hand, you are accepting an obligation to be polite 
with this person and answer his questions, which is exactly what he is relying on. 47 
 
The implicit understanding of the logic of entrapment is frequently shown by the authors of the 
advice, as in the following quote from a forum participant with the nickname ‘vovanoid’: ‘Do 
not give any direct answers to the questions that follow their script, otherwise they will put you 
through a real interrogation and will take issue with your answers’.48 
The best strategy, then, is not to respond directly to any questions asked by a gopnik 
(just as those accused of crime by police are often advised to keep silent). One can rarely win 
in this interaction, and risks being drawn more deeply into the trap. Furthermore, according to 
one forum participant, once a person responds, he finds that ‘as soon as you want to stop an 
unpleasant conversation, the aggressor will have a pretext to accuse you of disrespecting him 
and move to a physical attack’.49 ‘uralbrat’ explains: 
 
If they come up to you with a conversation, like ‘Hey, guy, do you live here? . . . In 
such situations if you strike first you will be wrong according to poniatiia . . . And if 
they later find you and fuck you up they will be right according to poniatiia . . . So my 
advice is to behave with confidence and not to speak of what you don’t know. For 
example, they ask you ‘Who are you in this life?’ A person who knows, he will know 
what to say (there is no standard answer, you must name yourself by what you really 
are). But a person who does not know will stumble here . . . So they will ask ‘Are you 
a lad at all?’ Of course, you will say, yes, who would say no??? And now the most 
interesting part: ‘Justify your answer, show that you are a lad’. Now you are in a stupor, 
how can I justify it? I understand of course that a person who grew up on the streets can 
answer ‘properly’, and if not, his mates will help him afterwards . . . But a person who 
lacks the street experience, who used to take music lessons, who was an exemplary boy 
in school, how can he respond to something he does not know? . . . I think it’s 
impossible. One should answer ‘I am a guy’ or ‘I am a male’. Now if they ask (and I 
insist, ask, and do not simply get into your pocket for money etc.), ‘Have you got any 
money?’ If you say you don’t have any, and they discover money in your pocket . . . 
they say you owe them, explain why you are a pizdobol [liar], and liars, as it is well 
known, always owe money . . . 50 
 
In the same conversation, another participant with the nickname ‘Kodak’, says: 
 
In order to be able to get out through conversation you need to know poniatiia, and you 
can only get information about them from ex-convicts and, paradoxically, via mass 
media. However, if they want to rob you or beat you up, they may neglect your 
knowledge of poniatiia and the ability to speak fenia [criminal slang], and a person who 
came from prison would suss it straight away if you want to fake it.  
 
According to Kazan gang researcher Alexander Shashkin, interrogation ultimately aims to 
produce a sense of worthlessness, ‘a life unworthy of being lived’ (as Agamben would put it).51 
Victims are made to experience a sense of guilt of having violated the extant law. In his analysis 
of interview data with gang members and their victims, Shashkin shows that ‘gang members 
manage to instil a sense of guilt even when the situation does not presume somebody being 
right or wrong; the victim is being persuaded that he is “not right”’.52 
If a person complies with the gang’s demands for money, they become liable to 
continuous extortion. A victim is labelled a terpila (passive sufferer) or a sladkii (sweet one), 
and the expectation is that he will have to pay until the gang decides it is no longer worth its 
while to collect the money. 
In exchange for the money, the gang claims to provide a krysha (a roof – i.e. protection), 
promising to defend the victim from assaults from other gangs or street hooligans. It remains, 
however, entirely at the gang’s discretion whether to provide this protection or not. Shashkin 
quotes a gang member who says that if a victim ‘“feeds the lads”, it is possible to go and 
negotiate on his behalf’. Another gang member, however, described the gang’s treatment of 
the victims of extortion in a different way: 
 
They are like dairy cows. The lads simply milk them for money, live at their expense . 
. . I just tell him, like, ‘listen, pal, if you have any problems, just come to me, I’ll help 
you’. That’s all. If he does come, I’ll just brush him off, like ‘I’m busy, pal’. ‘What’s 
up,’ I’d say, ‘what happened?’ He’d say this and that. I’d say, ‘Look, pal, you are in the 
wrong here, and you have to sort it out. I have my own problems now, my own business 
to take care of. I’ll not help out some chort [a person who does not live according to 
poniatiia]’. 53 
 
The gangs also present themselves as agents of morality and law, and construct guilt through 
practices where the lads pretend to be concerned with violations of social order within the 
community, as described by Dmitry Gromov in his study of other areas of Russia.54 By 
punishing ‘transgressors’, they act as if out of concern for common good. Thus, ‘assault 
through conversation’ may involve an accusation that a young man has upset or assaulted an 
old person, a woman or a child living in the area. In most cases these offenses are totally 
fictitious. Sometimes a provocation, a deliberate entrapment, is involved (something that, in 
different forms, also happens within the state’s law and order practices). For example, in a 
typical scenario of provoking the victim found in urban areas across Russia, the lads ask a 
young boy to come to a group of young men and ask them for a cigarette. When they refuse, 
the boy starts whining that he was badly treated, after which the gang arrives with a ready 
justification to attack the ‘transgressors’ who have just hurt a ‘little one’.  
In a different scenario, the ‘offenders’ are accused of being noisy and disorderly. For 
example, a group of street lads would come to a group of non-gang young men who are told 
that they are being too loud: ‘Why are you shouting? Children and women are sleeping. 
Everyone’s tired’. This becomes a pretext for assault. Alternatively, a person may be judged to 
be dressed improperly. A member of a youth subcultural group, a goth or a punk, for example, 
can be accused of wearing the wrong clothes: ‘Why are you dressed like this? It’s off-putting 
for people just to look at you!’ 
In some urban areas the local lads establish a ‘curfew’. Nobody is supposed to be 
hanging out on the streets after a certain time. There is no problem if a person walks home 
quietly on his own, but if a young man is out with a girl he will be told: ‘You should obey the 
order, get out of here’, and similarly, a group of people coming into the territory can be told 
that they were violating the curfew.55 Through this, and the other devices described above, the 
lads constitute themselves as agents of social order, while at the same time, of course, violating 
it daily themselves. 
The trap here is constituted through the use of conventional morality to accuse the 
civilians of transgression. But the transgression itself is fictitious and construed by the lads 
with the sole purpose of establishing themselves as the agents of local power.  
 
Political strategies of entrepreneurial gangs: the trap of protection 
As my Kazan research illustrated, similarly to members of violent street groups, members of 
entrepreneurial gangs also acted as order making agents in the territory. Their strategies of 
territorial control were much more expansive, and involved, in addition to episodic street 
violence against local non-gang young people (committed, as a rule, by members of the 
younger cohorts), informal policing of the territory. They harassed drug addicts or dealers who 
were not part of their gangs, explaining in interviews that they were polluting the territory. 
They helped the residents reclaim their money and possessions from outside criminals who had 
committed theft or burglary in the area. During the crisis years of the 1990s, the gangs also 
provided the residents with food and money and even installed secure doors in the entrances to 
blocks of flats. In the 2000s when my research took place, this was no longer the case, but the 
gangs gave money to churches and mosques, funded sports facilities for young people and were 
involved in a range of charitable activities in the city. 
The most profound expression of their role as the agents of power in the territory were 
their protection operations. The younger members offered protection to their nongang peers, 
promising to defend them from other gangs. This protection was, according to the lads’ own 
accounts, by and large fictitious and was, in reality, thinly masked extortion. They also set up, 
with the help of their leaders and corrupt transport policemen, semi-legal street parking lots, 
forcing the car owners to pay them for an equally fictitious service. They offered the car owners 
secure parking, but in fact provided no recompense if a car was stolen or damaged. 
The older lads and their leaders offered protection to businessmen, market traders, 
owners of cafes and restaurants, taxi drivers and managers of transport companies. For a share 
of the individuals’ or the companies’ profits, they provided services in resolving conflicts, 
collecting business intelligence, lending money or helping to find access to (corrupt) members 
of the police and other state authority. But rather than providers of services, gang members 
perceived themselves as sovereign agents who were receiving tribute from local businessmen 
– unless these businessmen’s status allowed them the protection of the state. As one gang 
member, Anvar, explained, 
 
We have our own territory, where you can’t do business without the senior members’ 
permission – no setting up stalls or parking lots or the like. Naturally, the construction 
of big shops like supermarkets happens regardless of the street [gang], but all the small-
time traders live under us. Anyone who wants to can walk around our territory, we don’t 
charge tolls, but if someone wants to make dough, they’ve got to share because it’s our 
territory. 
 
Protection was unreliable, and profoundly influenced by the lads’ belief that the komersy, apart 
from owing them money, were also inferior human beings. A komers, as Agamben would say, 
was always ‘a being in-debt’56 and the gang could deprive him of any rights, ban him from the 
territory or kill him. 
From interviews with businessmen and gang members, it was clear that the relationship 
of protection, for all the benefits it could potentially give, functioned as a trap. People who 
came under protection and started paying the gang could not stop on their own accord, and only 
if the protectors decided that they did not want one’s business anymore could the businessmen 
stop paying the gang. At the same time the gang members could refuse to come to a 
businessman’s defence by saying that they were too ‘busy’ (this could happen even in situations 
where businessmen under their protection were assaulted by criminals or members of a rival 
gang), or simply by not answering their mobile phones in response to calls and texts from their 
‘clients’.57 However, any reneging on obligations by the civilians was seen by the gangs as an 
offence and meant an immediate and severe punishment. 
Rather than contractual obligations, the constitutive foundations of the gangs’ power 
lay in application of pure force that says, ‘X needs to pay us because he lives in our territory’, 
or ‘X needs to pay us if he wants to work on our territory’, or ‘X needs to pay us because he 
violated our rules’. The civilians could always be punished for violation of the gang’s poniatiia. 
But while the language of punishment was used both by the residents and businessmen, and 
the gang members, it was clear to everyone that a civilian’s crime could be constructed at will, 
and there was always a way in which he could be defined as culpable. Looking at a gang 
member in a wrong way (or not looking at him at all), being slow with providing payment, 
even expecting the gang to offer the promised protection could all be construed as violations 
of the law in which the sovereign decides what is lawful and what is not. The pretexts were 
manifold. As Nemets, one of Kazan gang members, said: ‘If you dig deep enough into anyone, 
you’ll find some kind of flaw. And when you’ve found it, you can beat them up for it.’ 
The application of gang law was always vague and indeterminate, and as Bogdan, 
another gang member, said, ‘To say definitively who you can or cannot beat up is impossible. 
Everything depends on the situation. I’ve used violence against those older than me, and those 
younger, but there was always something to punish them for.’ Kirill expressed less aggressive 
but still very flexible views on the limits on violence: ‘I prefer to resolve issues peacefully, 
without bloodshed, even though we can come and grind everybody into dust at any time. You 
have to know how to find the right solution, make mutual concessions. But even more I prefer 
to put people into situations where they are wrong according to poniatiia’. 
At the same time, residents reported deep disorientation and terror in their encounters 
with gang members. The sense of being in the presence of supreme force that operates on the 
basis of its own inscrutable law was well expressed by one of the authors of advice or how to 
behave if confronted by ‘real lads’: 
 
Our fear comes from not knowing the rules according to which ‘that’ world operates. 
But we inherently respect them. Because these are the rules of the strong, the poniatiia. 
We respect the world of the strong, the world of thieves and bandits. But there is no 
direct access to that world, and the full code of poniatiia is not available to us mere 
mortals. We accept them unquestioningly, but we do not know their principles and 
norms.58 
 
The realisation that in the presence of sovereign power, one is reduced to being bare life was 
expressed well by Rustem, a local Kazan resident, who said, ‘When talking to people, the gang 
members try to show that they are “from the street”, that they have support, that they are the 
kings, and that you are just a lokh, and your life is theirs to do with as they will.’ Another Kazan 
resident, Fanil, explained: ‘What’s crucial is that they always think of themselves as being right 
and will always make you wrong. If they want, gang members can always find a pretext to 
punish you.’ They describe a situation of the sovereign exception ‘in which everything that the 
sovereign deemed de facto necessary could happen’.59  
 
The trap as a site of power  
As we have seen, the political strategies of the gang can be often seen as strategies of 
entrapment. Entrapment is clearly present in both ‘assault through conversation’ and 
‘protection’ scenarios. Of course, it is the nature of traps that they remain unknown to their 
victims, who unintentionally step into them. ‘Laying a trap’ is a pre-planned and carefully 
choreographed operation. Here a space is created where a victim suddenly finds himself at the 
mercy of those who set the trap and who now control the situation, possessing the victim’s 
time, setting the limits to his mobility and effectively manipulating his emotional state. The 
victims do not know what it is in store for them and may believe that other rules apply to the 
situation. They end up confused and disorientated. They are in a space of exception, stripped 
of the rights they may have assumed they had, but which they decisively lack now. 
A trap constitutes a site of maximum power, depriving victims not just of capacity, but 
often of any inclination to resist. Unlike pure force, which is purposive, direct and immediate, 
a trap creates a space where power can be exercised at leisure. In Crowds and Power, Canetti 
explained that, unlike pure force, power can also be ceremonious and slow. He used the 
example of a cat and a mouse to illustrate his point. Playing with the mouse, the cat does not 
use immediate force. 
 
It lets it go, allows it to run about a little and even turns its back; and, during this time, 
the mouse is no longer subjected to force. But it is still within the power of the cat and 
can be caught again . . . The space which the cat dominates, the moment of hope it 
allows the mouse, while continuing however to watch it closely all the time and never 
relaxing its interest and intention to destroy it – all this together, space, hope, 
watchfulness and destructive intent, can be called the actual body of power, or more 
simply, power itself. 60 
 
Traps, obfuscations, indeterminacy and vagueness, sudden changes of rules, emergence of 
breaks in the presumed order and radical changes in the rights and identities of the individuals 
that find themselves entrapped – all of these are the instruments of power, and we can, I believe, 
analyse them productively both in relation to criminal governance and to the modern state. 
 
Conclusion 
Gang researchers sometimes apply the metaphor of a nation to a gang.61 Gangs, like nations, 
establish their own borders and mark their territory, design their own insignia and symbols, 
develop mythologies and historical traditions, declare wars and set up war councils, invent 
initiation and expulsion rituals that are similar to the rituals relating to citizenship etc. While it 
is possible to interpret these practices as a continuation of childhood games,62 I would argue 
that they need to be taken much more seriously, as indications of the actual presence of 
localised sovereignty. Gangs develop their territorial monopolies of force and may also aspire 
to a degree of legitimacy, of being recognised as the source of law and moral regulation in the 
local space. 
Yet the paradox of their power (and, following Schmitt and Agamben, we can say of 
any power) is that it also contains, and legitimises, lawlessness. The gangs create a state of 
exception using their law to justify deprivation of the non-gang civilians of rights and dignity. 
We are looking here at expression of power not as a contract but as violence. It aims to produce 
what Hannah Arendt called ‘unquestioning obedience’ rather than consent.63 
The law contains its own negation as the civilians are given identities that allow 
lawlessness towards them. While poniatiia can contain prescriptions that limit bespredel, they 
ultimately express the power of the dominant group, the power that is founded on the original 
distinction between the sovereign agents, the lads and the powerless lokhi and komersy. 
The lads’ political strategies are often associated with entrapment, creation of spaces of 
exception in which the victim is stripped of his previous identity and may also be constructed 
as a person who has shown disobedience and disrespect to the masters and needs to be punished 
for it. This takes place in violent encounters on the streets, as well as in institutionalised 
relations of protection, which the civilians cannot leave and where the rights they were 
promised can be withdrawn. For the victims, entrapment leads to what Agamben, after Berger 
and Luckman, called ‘anomic terror’,64 a sense of disorientation and anxiety that accompanies 
the breakdown of expected social order. 
The paradox that gang governance contains – the co-presence of law and lawlessness, 
order and disorder – is the paradigmatic expression of power. The gang in its brutality exposes 
the very features of power that may be hidden in the operation of other power regimes. The 
suspension of law and designation of the person or persons who are deprived of their rights as 
weird, unreasonable, disloyal or disrespectful, as transgressors of social/corporate/state norms 
and laws who brought their punishment upon themselves, occurs in many spaces where power 
operates. It is here that we find traps set to extract existing identities and capacity to act from 
individuals and reduce them to bare life.  
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